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What is the relationship between insularity—a state’s separation from other states via large bodies of water—and expansion? The
received wisdom, prominent in (though not exclusive to) realist theories, holds that insularity constrains expansion by making
conquest difficult. We contend, by contrast, that this received wisdom faces important limits. Focusing on U.S. expansion via
means short of conquest, we interrogate the underlying theoretical logics to demonstrate that insular powers enjoy two distinct
advantages when it comes to expansion. First, insularity translates into a “freedom to roam”: because insular powers are less
threatened at home, they can project more power and influence abroad. Second, insularity “sterilizes” power, which explains why
insular powers are seen as attractive security providers and why we do not see more counterbalancing against them. On net, existing
scholarship is correct to argue that insularity impedes conquest between great powers. Still, it has missed the ways that insularity
abets expansion via spheres of influence abroad. One consequence is an under-appreciation for the role of geography writ large and
insularity in particular in shaping contemporary great power behavior.
W
hat is the relationship between insularity—a
state’s separation from other states via large
bodies of water—and great power politics? Insu-
larity plays a major explanatory role in prominent inter-
national relations (IR) theories, particularly those
emphasizing material and geopolitical factors as drivers
of state behavior (Jervis 1978; Mearsheimer 2014). Like-
wise, the issue is central to policy discussions over Ameri-
can grand strategy as analysts debate whether the United
States can or should remain deeply engaged abroad (Posen
2014; Brooks and Wohlforth 2016; Van Hooft 2020).
Despite its theoretical and policy salience, however, insu-
larity’s impact on international relations and, especially,
great power politics remains undertheorized.
To the extent there is a received wisdom, scholars
emphasize insularity’s tendency to constrain great powers
from expanding by inhibiting conquest, thereby limiting
the intensity of competition between them (Layne 2002;
Mearsheimer 2014; Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell
2016). Broadly rooted in realist approaches to IR theory
(though not exclusively; see Lake 1999, 46), this argument
hinges on the difficulty of projecting military power across
large bodies of water and, relatedly, the defensive advan-
tages enjoyed by insular powers. Still, this line of reasoning
faces empirical and theoretical limits. For one thing, claims
of insularity’s expansion-inhibiting nature have difficulty
fully accounting for the behavior of insular powers: even
without conquering other great powers, there are prom-
inent cases of insular powers that have been quite expan-
sionist. Most notably, the United States carved out spheres
of influence in geopolitically vital areas such as Western
Europe, East Asia, and theMiddle East afterWorldWar II
(Gaddis 1982; Leffler 1992; Trachtenberg 1999) that
endure to this day (Silove 2016; Sayle 2019;Moller 2020).
Theoretically, meanwhile, the claim that insularity
inhibits expansion is problematic. Path-breaking
John Schuessler is Associate Professor in the Department of
International Affairs and Co-Director of the Albritton Center
for Grand Strategy at the Bush School of Government and
Public Service, Texas A&M University (jmschues@tamu.
edu). He is the author of Deceit on the Road to War:
Presidents, Politics, and American Democracy (Cornell
University Press, 2015).
Joshua Shifrinson is Associate Professor of International
Relations at Boston University (jris@bu.edu). His research
examines great power politics, international security, and
U.S. foreign policy. A graduate of MIT, he is most recently the
author of Rising Titans, Falling Giants: HowGreat Powers
Exploit Power Shifts (Cornell University Press, 2018).
David Blagden is Senior Lecturer at the University of
Exeter’s Strategy and Security Institute (D.W.Blagden@ex-
eter.ac.uk). His research has been published in International
Security, Security Studies, International Studies Quar-
terly, Survival, International Affairs, Foreign Policy Ana-
lysis, and International Studies Review, among other
outlets. He obtained his DPhil at the University of Oxford.
doi:10.1017/S153759272100222X
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Political Science Association. This is an Open
Access article, distributed under the terms of theCreativeCommonsAttribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which
permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. 1
https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759272100222X
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 92.236.48.118, on 15 Nov 2021 at 12:28:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
scholarship on hegemony (Ikenberry and Nexon 2019;
Nexon and Neumann 2018), hierarchy (Lake 1999,
2009), imperialism (Go 2011; Nexon and Wright 2007)
and order (Ikenberry 2011; Cooley and Nexon 2020)
features great powers that have extended their political
reach by constructing spheres of influence, establishing
protectorates, and forming empires without resorting to
conquest. The emphasis thus far, however, has been on the
economic (Norrlof 2010), institutional (Ikenberry 2001;
Goh 2007), and normative (Kupchan 2014) factors that
help states craft superior-subordinate relations over others
and shape the varied patterns of influence that result. Less
work has been done evaluating geopolitical factors such as
insularity that may enable expansion in the first place. This
is important because previous studies of insularity have
occasionally implied that it can offer great powers advan-
tages—for example, in the form of reduced counterbalan-
cing—that may plausibly facilitate expansion through
non-conquest means (Walt 1987; Joffe 1997; Levy and
Thompson 2010). Although no project has yet 1) distin-
guished among the mechanisms involved or 2) linked
individual findings into a broader theory of insular advan-
tages, the results again suggest that the received wisdom
treating insularity as a constraint on expansion is incom-
plete.
Researchers are thus left with a puzzle. Some insular
powers have expanded far and wide, and they have done so
without engaging in the conquest of other great powers.
With the logic linking insularity to non-expansion theor-
etically questionable, scholars lack an explanation for how
and why insular powers have been able to grow their
geopolitical footprint. The result is a gap in scholarship
on the relationship between insularity and great power
politics. Without claiming to develop a complete theory of
insularity, we look to begin addressing the gap by exam-
ining the mechanisms and conditions by which insularity
can facilitate great power expansion short of conquest.
We advance three claims. First, because existing studies
of insularity have largely occurred within the realist trad-
ition, they tend to understate the ways in which great
powers expand by focusing too narrowly on conquest.
Relaxing this assumption, we extend insights from
research on hegemony, hierarchy, imperialism, and order
to highlight that great powers can increase their geopolit-
ical footprint by constructing spheres of influence—geo-
graphic areas in which great powers dominate others’
strategic affairs (Lake 1999, 28-29; Lake 2009, 54; Jack-
son 2020).1 Second, insularity affects the opportunity
structure a great power faces if it seeks to expand. On
one level, insularity lowers the cost a great power pays to
provide security for itself, freeing up and increasing the
supply of resources that it can use to project power and
influence abroad. Insular powers, in other words, are free
to roam. At the same time, insularity makes a great power
less threatening to other states than if it were located
onshore. This explains why insular powers are often seen
as attractive security providers and why there is not more
counterbalancing against them.
Third, the onshore distribution of power plays a crucial
role in mediating when insular powers are able to utilize
these advantages and expand. All things being equal,
insular powers are more likely to expand via spheres of
influence when a given region is menaced by a potential
hegemon, or divided among at least two competing great
powers. Under such conditions, imperiled states seeking
security are likely to invite an insular power onshore into a
given region and seek to keep it engaged. Conversely, other
distributions of power can either 1) inhibit insular power
expansion entirely (if a region is dominated by a single
great power) or 2) invite military conquest of non-great
powers (if an area lacks a great power).
The implications of this argument are stark. At root, the
received wisdom on insularity may have it backwards: far
from being constrained, insular powers may be uniquely
privileged in growing their geopolitical footprint. In turn,
underscoring that insular powers can expand by crafting
spheres of influence raises the possibility of better linking
research emphasizing material and geopolitical factors
with scholarship on the economic, institutional, and nor-
mative underpinnings of hierarchy and hegemonic order.
Rather than existing as disparate bodies of work, each may
complement the other. We expand on these points later.
The remainder of this article proceeds in several sec-
tions. Following this introduction, we review the literature
on insularity and expansion. Second, we highlight the
limits of the received wisdom. From there—third—we
extend existing research on insularity’s advantages by
highlighting the ways in which insularity can facilitate
expansion via spheres of influence. Fourth, we hypothesize
the effect of the distribution of power on insular power
expansion. Fifth, we apply this framework to the United
States—the insular power par excellence—and show how
the argument can help explain the course of American
grand strategy. Finally, we discuss the implications of our
argument for theory and policy, paying particular atten-
tion to how a richer understanding of insularity can
contribute to IR theory and, especially, scholarship on
hierarchy and hegemonic order.
Insularity and Expansion
In the context of great power politics, what is the relation-
ship between insularity and expansion? We define insu-
larity as being surrounded by water. An insular power
would thus be the only great power on a large body of land
that is surrounded on all sides by water.2 A continental
power, on the other hand, would be a great power located
on a large body of land that is also occupied by at least one
other great power (Mearsheimer 2014, 126).3 We define
expansion, in turn, as the extension of a state’s territorial
control or political influence (Gilpin 1981, 106).
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If there is a received wisdom on the link between
insularity and expansion, it is that insularity constrains
expansion, primarily by making the conquest of other
great powers exceedingly difficult (Jervis 1978, 189; Talia-
ferro 2000, 139; Van Evera 1999, 121; Glaser and Kauf-
mann 1998, 58). This argument is most clearly developed
in the realist tradition which, as a body of work empha-
sizing states’ desire for power and security and the causal
weight of material factors, has tended to be most attuned
to the influence of geography in general and insularity in
particular (for a partial exception, see Lake 1999, 44-46).
In this vein, defensive realism finds that insularity influ-
ences the severity of the security dilemma between great
powers by affecting their ability to attack and conquer one
another (Taliaferro 2000: 136-41). Here, being sur-
rounded by water particularly advantages the defense
relative to the offense. Robert Jervis lays out the key
elements of the argument in his treatment of the security
dilemma, offering that, “Anything that increases the
amount of ground the attacker has to cross, or impedes
his progress across it, or makes him more vulnerable while
crossing, increases the advantage accruing to the defense.
When states are separated by barriers that produce these
effects, the security dilemma is eased, since both can have
forces adequate for defense without being able to attack.”
Large bodies of water such as oceans serve the same
function in this respect: “Being hard to cross, they allow
defense against superior numbers. The defender has
merely to stay on his side of the barrier and so can utilize
all the men he can bring up to it. The attacker’s men,
however, can cross only a few at a time, and they are very
vulnerable when doing so.” If all states were islands, each
would thus be largely secure (Jervis 1978, 194–96; also
Van Evera 1998, 19; Glaser and Kaufmann 1998, 64-66;
Glaser 2010, 141).
Offensive realism converges with defensive realism on
insularity’s essential defense-dominance (Blagden, Levy,
and Thompson 2011, 196). Here, the stopping power of
water (Mearsheimer 2014, 114-128)—the limits that
large bodies of water place on states’ ability to project land
power—inhibits insular powers from attacking great
powers outside their regions. This explains why great
powers can only aspire to regional hegemony despite the
fact that they would be more powerful and secure as global
hegemons. In doing so, insularity adds a defensive element
to an international system otherwise primed for offense.
Although less precise than either offensive or defensive
realism, classical (Morgenthau 1963, 110-112) and neo-
classical (Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell 2016, 41-42)
realism take a similar approach, suggesting that insularity
limits the external threats that great powers face and so
reduces their need to expand in kind. Meanwhile, scholars
utilizing insights from existing discussions of insularity to
explain particular strategies by individual great powers
echo these claims. Josef Joffe, for instance, contends that
insularity “granted Britain that rarest gift of inter-state
politics: immunity from direct attack,” pushing Britain to
prefer “balancing [against great power threats] rather than
conquest” (Joffe 1997, 102, 104). Similarly, Jennifer Lind
argues that Japanese insularity reduced its fears of attack
during the Cold War, leading it to underinvest in military
power relative to its economic potential and forego efforts
at overseas power projection (Lind 2004, 104, 117).
Insularity and Expansion: The Limits of
the Received Wisdom
In sum, the received wisdom holds that insularity is a
constraint on expansion. We contend, by contrast, that
this received wisdom is incomplete. First and foremost, the
claim that insularity constrains expansion has difficulty
accounting for insular powers’ behavior, with the United
States’ record of expansion since 1945 posing a particular
challenge. After all, as the insular power par excellence—
surrounded by oceans on two sides, with weak neighbors
to the north and south—the United States should be
among the least likely of great powers to expand abroad.
In fact, just the opposite has occurred.
Since World War II, the United States has built what
Geir Lundestad terms an “empire by invitation,” project-
ing power overseas in geopolitically significant regions
such as Western Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East
(Lundestad 1999). The effort has gone beyond simply
maintaining a diplomatic and military footprint to hedge
against regional disturbances. Instead, the United States
has worked to control and structure regional dynamics in
accordance with American interests. To do so, it has
deployed large military forces abroad, committed substan-
tial sums of money to overseas operations, involved itself
heavily in regional diplomatic and economic affairs, and
even risked war against capable states such as the Soviet
Union, Iraq, and China (Jaffe 1993; Trachtenberg 1999;
Layne 2002; Lake 2008, 2009; Hoffman 2013; Brooks
and Wohlforth 2016; Silove 2016; Cooley and Nexon
2020; Moller 2020). Equally telling, the United States has
increased its overseas presence over time, as NATO’s post-
Cold War move into Eastern Europe and ongoing efforts
to bolster the U.S. commitment in Asia illustrate (Sarotte
2019a; Lind 2014).
For sure, relatively little of the United States’ effort
involved conquest, with much of its overseas presence
negotiated with continental actors. Still, if the idea that
insularity constrains expansion is to mean anything, we
would not expect the United States to retain such an
extensive presence abroad over such a lengthy period.
Nor has the effort been entirely cooperative, with the
United States frequently coercing other major powers such
as Britain, France, Germany, the Soviet Union, and China
in order to advance its overseas interests, often risking
military confrontation along the way (Woods 1990; King-
seed 1995; Trachtenberg 1999; Shifrinson 2018, chap. 5;
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Silove 2016; Campbell and Sullivan 2019). These efforts
are again difficult to explain if insularity mostly promotes
restraint.
Neither can insular expansion be dismissed as an
American phenomenon, as other insular powers have
acted similarly. During its zenith in the nineteenth cen-
tury, for example, the United Kingdom possessed a sizable
fraction of global economic and military capabilities, and
unrivalled command of the seas (Singer, Bremer, and
Stuckey 1973; Rodger 2006). As an insular power able
to control its own moats, the received wisdom would
predict British restraint vis-à-vis other great powers. Yet,
while it is true that the United Kingdom never sought to
conquer the major states of continental Eurasia, it never-
theless expanded at their expense through a variety of
channels. Thus, Britain challenged Russian claims in
Central Asia, asserted dominance over the Yokohama
Treaty Port that the U.S. Navy had opened in Japan,
preempted France by annexing Egypt to ensure access to
the Suez Canal, and competed with France and Germany
for colonies in Africa—even risking near-wars with each in
the late 1800s and early 1900s (Porter and Low 1999).
Likewise, Japan expanded its footprint throughout East
Asia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
not conquering other great powers but frequently challen-
ging their interests—culminating in war against Russia.
Again, such efforts are puzzling if insularity is constrain-
ing.4
The record of insular power expansion also highlights a
conceptual dilemma with existing research, in that current
studies rely upon a circumscribed definition of what
expansion entails. To date, scholars interested in insularity
have tended to equate expansion with conquest, that is,
one state forcibly seizing some or all of the territory held by
another. This type of expansion is certainly important—
indeed, it occupies a prominent place in European diplo-
matic history and IR theory. Still, it is not axiomatic that
expansion is synonymous with conquest.
This point is captured in the literatures on hegemony,
hierarchy, imperialism, and order. As scholars such as
David Lake, John Ikenberry, and Daniel Nexon under-
score, great powers have been able to structure and influ-
ence the policy choices of other actors while stopping short
of conquest. This insight applies to the contemporary
United States: in one recent treatment, Nexon and Alex-
ander Cooley emphasize that “within broader inter-
national order we find an American hegemonic system …
within which the United States directly orders and takes
leadership of economic, security, and political relations”
(Cooley and Nexon 2020, 46; see also Lake 2009, 82). To
be clear, this body of research largely sidesteps the geopol-
itical factors that may enable expansion in order to focus
on the economic, institutional, and normative factors
undergirding the formation of different kinds of ordered
relationships. Indeed, to the extent insularity enters the
equation, research in this vein seems to largely accept the
received wisdom of insularity as a constraint on expansion
(Lake 1999, 46). Still, the scholarly program as a whole
clarifies that great powers can expand short of conquest by
crafting spheres of influence—more or less formally
defined geographic areas in which great powers dominate
others’ strategic affairs and, by extension, exclude outside
actors from similar influence over the same space (Lake
1999, 28-29; Lake 2009, 54; Jackson 2020).
Of course, the nature of the political relationships that
characterize spheres of influence can vary, with some
spheres characterized by mutually beneficial leader-subor-
dinate relationships (Lake 1993; Clark 2009a, 2009b)
while others entail little more than strong states maintain-
ing self-interested arrangements at the expense of the weak
(Layne 2006). At the limit, spheres of influence can even
evolve into arrangements affecting the domestic politics of
subordinate actors (Lake 1999; Go 2011). Regardless of
the form it takes, however, expansion via spheres of
influence is still expansion, with the effort involving real
costs and benefits for the sphere-builder.
In terms of costs, sphere-of-influence-building involves
shaping others’ choices via statecraft short of brute force.
Hence, it can require states to extend diplomatic and
security commitments, deploy troops, and provide eco-
nomic aid while risking conflict with competitors opposed
to their expansion. On the benefits side, spheres can
provide states greater leverage over their international
environments than would otherwise be the case by foster-
ing military quiescence, economic remuneration, and
diplomatic fealty from those in one’s sphere. Given that
conquest has become progressively less appealing
(Schweller 2011; Fazal 2007) as weaponry has become
more destructive (Mueller 1989), the economics of con-
quest less obvious,5 nationalism more pronounced
(Roshwald 2000), and norms of territorial integrity more
robust (Zacher 2001),6 non-conquest methods of expan-
sion such as spheres of influence are poised to be particu-
larly relevant for contemporary world politics.
Insularity as Facilitator of Expansion
In tandem, the empirical problem posed by insular
powers’ record of expansion and the theoretical problem
in equating expansion with conquest suggest that existing
scholarship linking insularity with non-expansion is
incomplete. Rather than discard the received wisdom,
we seek to reformulate and adapt its core insights. In the
process, we draw on research implying that insular powers
may enjoy advantages in great power politics—in particu-
lar, that insularity may facilitate power projection while
reducing others’ tendency to counterbalance. While this
research is not focused on expansion as such, we extend its
insights to specifically consider its implications for insular
power expansion.
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Our starting premise is that although insularity cannot
explain why great powers expand, it shapes their oppor-
tunity structure when they seek to expand.7 More specif-
ically, insular powers—like other great powers—can face a
mix of security and non-security motives to expand that
vary across time and space (Glaser 2010; Grynaviski 2018;
Shifrinson 2018). Yet, because insularity—as the received
wisdom emphasizes—makes the conquest of other great
powers difficult,8 insular powers are pushed to consider
alternate ways of expanding. This is where spheres of
influence come into play.
In turn, insularity provides great powers with two
advantages in constructing spheres of influence. First,
insular powers are free to roam: secure at home, they enjoy
a margin of strategic error that allows them to focus on
projecting power and influence abroad. Second, insular
powers’ geographic remove makes them attractive security
partners for states located in geopolitically crowded neigh-
borhoods, increasing the demand for their presence
abroad. Each mechanism has been flagged in previous
research, but their combined impact in terms of facilitating
expansion via spheres of influence has been overlooked.
We treat each in turn.
Freedom to Roam
First, insularity lowers the cost a great power pays to
provide security for itself, thereby freeing up resources
with which it can expand. The relatively stronger an
insular power, meanwhile, the more resources it has to
devote to expansion.9 Insular powers can be usefully
contrasted in this respect with continental powers, which
must devote most of their strategic effort to competing
with each other and are limited in their ability to pursue
outside ambitions.10 Insular powers, in other words, are
free to roam, which positions them well to project power
and influence abroad.
Consider, again, the U.S. case. The fact that the
U.S. homeland is surrounded by large bodies of water
means that the risk of attack and invasion is minimal even
in the face of hostile powers. This surplus of security gives
the United States strategic flexibility, enabling it to project
power abroad. As Mearsheimer puts it (2014, 365), “one
of the main reasons the United States is able to station
military forces all around the globe and intrude in the
politics of virtually every region is that it faces no serious
threats in the Western Hemisphere. If the United States
had dangerous foes in its own backyard, it would be much
less capable of roaming into distant regions.” In other
words, because the United States is an insular power, it can
afford to be a global power (Layne 2006, 29).
Nor is the United States the only insular power to have
benefitted from the freedom to roam. As Joffe (1995) and
others underscore, Britain in its heyday could choose the
extent to which it engaged in European great power
squabbles, as well as entertain empire-building overseas,
in good part because of the protection afforded by the
English Channel.11 Similarly, Japan’s ability to craft an
Asian empire in the early twentieth century was helped by
the fact that, as an archipelago, Japan could focus on power
projection beyond its borders rather than defending itself
at home. In fact, as Philip Streich and Jack Levy (2016)
illustrate, Japan was sufficiently confident in its security by
the early 1900s that it was even willing to compete with
the much stronger Russian Empire for hegemony in
East Asia.
Insular powers can be usefully contrasted with contin-
ental powers. To be sure, continental powers such as
Imperial Spain, France, and Germany have sought to
expand by developing forces for extra-regional power
projection (Levy and Thompson 2010). When threatened
by continental neighbors, however, or confronted by
insular powers enjoying extra security, continental actors
have been compelled to focus on territorial defense while
sacrificing overseas power projection. Tellingly, for
instance, Wilhelmine Germany was frustrated in its quest
for world power by the resource demands of building a
navy that could challenge Britain at sea and an army that
could confront the Franco-Russian alliance on land
(Murray 2010). Unable to afford both land and sea power,
Germany was forced to focus on continental security.12 A
rising China faces similar constraints today in breaking out
of East Asia (Ross 2009; Montgomery 2014, 124-125).
The freedom to roam is not sacrosanct. Although
insular powers enjoy significant security that can enable
roaming, both the rise of a continental hegemon
(Mearsheimer 2014) and development of technologies
that facilitate power projection over water (Adams
2003/04, 58n41; Gompert 2013, 21-24) can reduce the
protection afforded by insularity. Ceteris paribus, however,
insular powers’ baseline level of security is greater than that
of their continental counterparts: it takes comparably large
shifts in power or technological changes to affect their
security relative to continental actors. Hence, as Barry
Posen illustrates, France was forced to treat interwar
Germany as a threat earlier than Britain, in part because
France’s border with Germany deprived it of the security
enjoyed by the insular United Kingdom (Posen 1984,
105-16, 177). Similarly, the United States can remain
broadly indifferent to great power politics in other regions
unless a potential hegemon emerges that is poised to
mobilize that region’s resources against the United States
(Mearsheimer 2014, 142).
Sterilizing Effects of Insularity
The freedom to roam is of limited utility if states in other
regions are determined to keep the roaming state out.
Here, however, the second advantage of insularity applies:
insularity sterilizes the challenge posed by insular states’
5
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power, rendering it less threatening than if it were located
next door. The logic here is simple. Although insular
powers may have a large supply of resources to put toward
expansion, it remains more difficult for them to conquer
states that are separated from them by water than if those
same states were neighbors (Mearsheimer 2014, 114-119;
Posen 2002, 123). In this sense, insularity functions as a
specific manifestation of the “loss of strength” gradient. As
originally formulated, the loss of strength gradient cap-
tures the idea that states’ ability to project power declines
with distance (Boulding 1962, 230-31, 245-47). Extend-
ing this insight, Stephen Walt (1987, 23-24) proposed
that states’ proximity is a key component driving threat
perceptions and balancing: the closer states are to one
another, the more threatening they appear and the stron-
ger the balancing response.13 Distance alone, however,
fails to capture the impact of insularity. After all, France is
physically closer to insular Britain than continental Ger-
many, yet few would argue that French security policy
before 1945 was more focused on Britain than Germany.
Distance aside, the particular difficulty of projecting mili-
tary power across water meaningfully reduces the threat
offshore powers pose to those onshore.
The sterilizing effect of insularity has two consequences.
First, it makes insular powers attractive security providers,
increasing the demand for their onshore presence. All
things being equal, states in geopolitically crowded neigh-
borhoods should feel less menaced by insular powers than
by their continental neighbors while simultaneously cal-
culating that they can reap strategic advantages if they can
gain insular powers on their side.14 Hence, insular powers
should find themselves invited into key regions when
threats to the onshore balance of power demand a coun-
terweight. For sure, this trend is not absolute: by our logic,
insular powers need enough power projection to provide
security for others but not so much as to constitute an
overwhelming threat themselves. Still, because insularity
makes conquest difficult, this leaves a wide range of
conditions in which insular powers are relatively less
threatening to continental actors than their neighbors
and so are viewed as attractive security partners.
Tellingly, for example, major powers outside the West-
ern Hemisphere have sought U.S. help in regional com-
petitions spanning the two world wars (Tucker 2007; Cull
1995), the ColdWar (Sayle 2019), and the post-ColdWar
era (Sarotte 2009, 2019b). Likewise, British forces were
welcomed ashore by continental partners to counter
threats ranging from Hapsburg Spain and Napoleonic
France, to Imperial/Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union
(Steiner 1969; Howard 1972; Baylis 1984; Dockrill
2002). In fact, an alliance with an insular power can be
a sufficiently valuable commodity that continental states
are willing to make concessions that serve the insular
power’s interests rather than risk abandonment (Gerzhoy
2015; Schuessler and Shifrinson 2019); this gives insular
powers leverage to restrain risky behavior by local partners
(Pressman 2008; Fang, Johnson, and Leeds 2014). Simply
put, insularity generates high demand for offshore powers
as allies, which translates into bargaining advantages over
those who want their protection.
Relatedly—second—insular powers face less counter-
balancing than they otherwise might. When an insular
power intervenes abroad to uphold the balance of power, it
disadvantages continental states that were poised to over-
turn the balance absent the insular power’s presence.
Theoretically, these states face incentives to counterbal-
ance the insular power. In practice, however, insularity
mitigates the problem. Being offshore, the insular power
poses less of a threat to such actors than if it were located
onshore. Thus, even rivals have reason to discount argu-
ments that the insular power challenges their security. At
the same time, if and when counterbalancing does occur,
the insular power can support continental actors directly
threatened (because of their location onshore) by the
balancing attempt. States seeking to counterbalance
thereby have a difficult time doing so as they must first
overcome local opposition facilitated by the insular power
(similarly, seeWohlforth 1999, 28). Finally, if all else fails,
the insular power can play to its strategic flexibility and
retrench (MacDonald and Parent 2011). Retrenchment
may not in itself eliminate counterbalancing, but it can
limit its intensity by lowering threat perceptions and
opening up space for reassurance (Stein 1991; Montgom-
ery 2006). In fact, by retrenching—or threatening to
retrench—the insular power may even convince rivals that
it represents the lesser of two evils, with the alternative
being a security competition with neighbors no longer
restrained by the insular power. In this way, the insular
power can garner grudging acceptance by rivals of the
status quo, further moderating counterbalancing.
Linking Insularity and the Onshore
Distribution of Power to Expansion
Combined, the freedom to roam and the sterilizing effect
of insularity can facilitate insular power expansion via
spheres of influence. On the one hand, the freedom to
roam allows insular powers to devote resources to expan-
sion abroad: secure at home, they are able to project power
and influence beyond their borders. Meanwhile, insular-
ity’s sterilizing effect makes offshore powers less of a threat
to continental powers than their neighbors. Hence, insular
powers find themselves invited into other regions as
security providers, gaining influence over continental
states in the process. In tandem, these pathways create a
space whereby insular powers are able to expand in ways
short of conquest: they can leverage their extra resources
and attractiveness as partners to gain access to other
regions and cultivate spheres of influence.
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Still, insular powers’ opportunity to expand by crafting
spheres is not unlimited. Instead, we hypothesize that
relative power—especially the onshore distribution of
power in regions of interest—is likely to influence whether
and when insular powers can play to their advantages and
expand in the manner described. Put simply, the onshore
distribution of power affects when insular powers are
invited into a region, the influence they can exert there,
and which (if any) states want them out. In turn, as the
onshore distribution of power varies, so too does the
capacity to create spheres of influence.
For the sake of theory development, we consider three
distinct onshore distributions of power while holding an
insular power’s strength constant. First, an insular power
might face a region dominated by a local hegemon. In this
scenario, an insular power’s ability to expand should be
limited as the hegemon would aim to keep the insular
power out; likewise, by virtue of the hegemon’s dominat-
ing regional politics, we further expect the hegemon’s
neighbors to defer to its wishes. Reinforcing the situation,
the insular power may be reluctant to expand in the first
place as it may worry about the hegemon’s meddling in its
own backyard.15
Alternatively, consider onshore distributions of power
that replicate what can be thought of as classic balance-of-
power situations: circumstances in which at least two
great powers are struggling for security vis-à-vis one
another. This set of conditions—which could encompass
bipolar, balanced multipolar, and unbalanced multipolar
systems—should be most conducive to insular power
expansion via spheres of influence. On one level, com-
petition among continental powers means that at least
one of them is likely to seek assistance from an insular
power that, because of the freedom to roam and difficulty
of conquering other powers, can contribute to the
onshore great power competition without overly threat-
ening the players. Put simply, regional great power
politics creates an opening for an insular power to move
onshore. At the same time, the insular power is well
positioned to demand concessions to its interests from
any continental powers that seek its backing. In this way,
it can exploit balance of power dynamics to expand
onshore and form a sphere of influence.
This logic further implies that an insular power’s space
to expand via spheres of influence is likely to grow the
more intensely that continental powers are threatened by
their onshore peers. The presence or emergence of unbal-
anced multipolarity—where one continental great power
looks poised to become a regional hegemon—seems
especially favorable for insular power expansion. With
relative power weighted in one continental state’s favor,
unbalanced multipolar environments are likely to create a
large demand for an insular power’s presence to offset the
potential hegemon on the part of most or all other
continental great powers threatened by domination.
Likewise, owing to the clear and pressing nature of the
threat, one expects menaced states to be willing to accede
to an insular power’s demands. Combined, insular
powers are poised to have multiple invitations onshore,
significant bargaining leverage, and the possibility of
creating a sphere of influence encompassing an array of
continental great powers. That said, it follows that the
potential hegemon would be especially focused on under-
mining the insular power’s sphere of influence and
pushing it offshore. Thus, it is no accident that the
United States 1) built its “empire by invitation” follow-
ing World War II when the Soviet Union loomed as a
potential hegemon that local states sought to resist, and
2) was opposed by the Soviet Union. Likewise, it is
unsurprising from this perspective that the American
presence in Asia is currently growing as Japan and other
regional states eye a rising China warily while China—as
the only challenger for regional hegemony – is increas-
ingly ambivalent over the United States’ presence
(Wuthnow 2018; Weiss 2019).
Finally, an insular power may face an onshore distribu-
tion without other great powers. In this scenario, an
insular power is poised to face few obstacles to expansion
of any kind. Indeed, even the received wisdom suggests
that conquest might be feasible under such conditions as
insular states that lack the capacity to conquer great powers
might be sufficiently strong to dominate the relatively
weak local actors involved. Local states may still invite
insular powers onshore in order to gain their support in
regional competitions, but—in practice—insular powers
retain the option to expand either via spheres of influence
or conquest as the imbalance of power in their favor
reduces the costs of using force; either form of expansion
would be possible. Similarly, the absence of other great
powers may make it especially easy for insular powers to
establish imperial relationships over local actors, whether
formal empire as in the case of Britain in the nineteenth
century or informal empire as in the case of the modern
United States (Kohli 2020).
Overall, the feasibility of conquest in this scenario
may help explain exceptions to the claim that insular
powers expand through means other than conquest. For
example, Japan built an overseas empire through con-
quest in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centur-
ies. Consistent with our framework, Japan’s primary
gains came in the parts of Asia (Taiwan, Korea, and a
fragmenting China) where other great powers were
absent.16 Likewise, the relatively low cost of conquest
absent other great powers might account for why Britain
conquered large portions of Africa and Asia in the
nineteenth century: although Britain confronted other
great powers in the process, major conquests in Africa
and Asia were predominantly at the expense of weak local
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Insularity in Action: American Grand
Strategy
Without claiming to offer a complete theory of insular
power expansion, we have thus far hypothesized why
insular power expansion is possible without the direct
conquest of other great powers, as well as the conditions
under which such expansion may occur.17 To showcase
the plausibility of our claims, it is worth briefly considering
the application of the argument to the United States, the
insular power par excellence. Here, our framework neatly
ties together a number of themes that are usually empha-
sized separately in the literature on American grand strat-
egy.
Ultimately, it is hard to argue that the United States has
not been expansionist. As noted earlier, since 1945 it has
cultivated spheres of influence in Western Europe, East
Asia, and the Middle East. Admittedly, the scope and
nature of these spheres have varied over time and space.
Nevertheless, the United States has generally embraced
extensive security commitments to the most capable states
in these areas and deployed large military forces to bolster
its commitments. The United States has also worked to
shape relations among states in its orbit in ways that
redound to its benefit while seeking to deter threats from
actors outside these arrangements. Collectively, this all
adds up to a preponderant American role in these regions
(Leffler 1992; Layne 2006; Brooks and Wohlforth 2016),
with even once-skeptical scholars referring to the United
States as a global hegemon after the Cold War (Posen
2014; Mearsheimer 2018; Walt 2018).
The extent of this expansion presents a puzzle for the
received wisdom, which has trouble explaining how and
why an insular power such as the United States could
successfully cultivate spheres of influence in several regions
over a decades-long period. In contrast, our claim that
insularity abets expansion through non-conquest means
helps capture this trend. By our logic, insularity may not
explain why the United States expands, but it neatly
illuminates why the United States enjoys the capacity
and opportunity to do so. In fact, several aspects of our
argument are evident in postwar American grand strategy.
For one thing, the United States has enjoyed nearly
unprecedented freedom to roam and has thus been able to
invest extensively in power projection. During the Cold
War, this involved forward-deployed forces in Europe and
Asia to help deter Soviet aggression, alongside
“expeditionary” forces suitable for rapid transport to global
hotspots. Similarly, faced today with China’s rise, strat-
egists are recalibrating the United States’ overseas pres-
ence, shifting military forces to Asia and acquiring
capabilities optimized for power projection in the region
(Hicks and Green 2016; Mitre 2018). Along the way, the
decades-long American investment in power projection
has yielded “command of the commons”: the ability to
unilaterally exploit the air, sea, and space domains while
denying their use to others (Posen 2003). Simply put,
insularity has enabled the United States to focus on
overseas contingencies without imperiling security
at home.
Second, and despite its investment in power projection,
the United States has been readily invited onshore in other
regions while gaining substantial influence over partners’
foreign policies. One of the more striking features of
American grand strategy has been the readiness with which
other countries have sought out an American presence and
encouraged U.S. inroads in their neighborhoods. Western
European states, for instance, lobbied the United States to
involve itself in European politics after World War II
against the Soviet Union (Ireland 1981). After the Cold
War, Eastern European states similarly called for NATO
enlargement to gain the United States as an ally against
Russia while Western European actors sought to keep the
United States in the region to offset a newly reunified
Germany (Goldgeier 1999; Sayle 2019; Sarotte 2019b).
Similar trends occurred in Asia—as local powers such as
Japan sought out an American commitment to offset the
Soviet Union and China (Nye 1995; Samuels 2007)—and
theMiddle East—where states as varied as Israel, Iran, and
Saudi Arabia have invited the United States into the region
at different times to address local security problems (Bar-
Siman-Tov, Hahn, and Schoenbaum 1998; Litwak 1984;
Long 1985). Once committed, meanwhile, the United
States has been able to influence local states’ security
policies by stymying partners’ nuclear aspirations (Gavin
2015), shaping allied diplomatic and military policies
(Trachtenberg 1999; Rapp-Hooper 2020), and blocking
alternate security systems from forming (Zoellick 2011;
Shifrinson 2020b). Along the way, states in the American
orbit have worried that the United States would play to its
insularity and abandon them, providing a potent source of
U.S. bargaining leverage (Trachtenberg 1999; Schuessler
and Shifrinson 2019).18 In sum, not only has the United
States been invited into other regions—a finding consist-
ent with our framework—but it has used this position to
influence regional dynamics in a manner conducive to
U.S. interests.
One might counter that the freedom to roam and
invitations onshore simply reflect the United States’ excep-
tional power. If so, then realist theories—as the body of
literature most focused on the role of power in inter-
national politics—would lead us to expect significant
counterbalancing: although bandwagoning occasionally
occurs, states are generally expected to balance against
powerful actors focused on projecting power beyond their
borders. Yet, while some states, at some times, have
attempted to check the United States, the scope of this
counterbalancing has, as our argument predicts, been
strikingly inconsistent. Equally important, the lack of
balancing does not seem to be explained by the narrow
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range of situations—primarily where states are revisionist
actors looking to gain for themselves (Schweller 1994) or
so weak that defeat is inevitable (Labs 1992)—where one
expects bandwagoning.
The Cold War, for example, certainly saw the Soviet
Union balance against the United States. Yet, as Trachten-
berg (1999) demonstrates, this behavior had important
limits. Indeed, by the 1960s, Soviet leaders sought to keep
the United States engaged in European security rather
than see the United States leave the continent. Nor was
this just a temporary aberration, as Soviet strategists
contemplating the end of the Cold War desired a con-
tinued American presence in Europe to hedge against a
possible German threat.19 Western European states have
exhibited parallel tendencies. Despite having the power
potential by the mid-Cold War to challenge the United
States, European counterbalancing was largely absent, as
calls from the mid-1970s onward to bolster intra-Euro-
pean cooperation against the United States regularly fal-
tered. As Timothy Sayle documents, states such as Britain,
France, and West Germany preferred to bank on offshore
American security guarantees rather than commit to trust-
ing one another (or Russia) (Sayle 2019, ch. 7).
Asia witnessed similar trends. For example, post-Cold
War East Asia initially saw both Japan and China bid to
keep the United States engaged in the region despite
concerns among analysts that one or both states might
try to counter the United States (Christensen 1999). And,
while it is true that China today is balancing the United
States, it is worth noting the elements of consistency in
Chinese strategy. Defense spending as a percentage of
Chinese gross domestic product has remained steady;
China has cultivated only a few weak allies; and much of
Chinese military doctrine is geared more to defending
against an American attack rather than pushing the United
States out of East Asia (Fravel 2019; Shifrinson 2020a). In
short, counterbalancing against the United States has been
muted even on the part of capable actors—an outcome
consistent with our logic.
Conclusion
To summarize, we explain why and how insularity can
facilitate great power expansion rather than—as the
received wisdom propose—inhibiting it. Insularity does
so by 1) increasing the resources that insular powers can
put toward power projection, and 2) rendering insular
powers less threatening to others such that it increases the
demand for their presence abroad. Depending on the
onshore distribution of power, these advantages can trans-
late into opportunities for insular powers to expand over-
seas by constructing spheres of influence.
Although not a full theory of insularity, our arguments
carry implications for future research, theory, and policy.
In terms of research, additional work is warranted to refine
the causal mechanisms and expand on the conditions
whereby insularity facilitates expansion. Here, examining
a broader set of great powers beyond the postwar United
States, nineteenth-century Britain and Imperial Japan
would be of use, as would further work on American,
British and Japanese expansion. It would also be valuable
to assess the extent to which our claims extend to insular
non-great powers such as Australia. Prima facie, it is
suggestive that such states have taken leading roles in
balancing prospective hegemons in their regions while
deploying forces far from home (Middleton 2011; Pack-
ham 2020), but additional research is warranted.
For theory, meanwhile, this article foregrounds the need
to re-examine the influence of insularity on international
politics. One issue concerns the prevalence of great power
expansion. If insularity facilitates expansion, then prom-
inent arguments that insular powers are uniquely unlikely
to grow their geopolitical footprint need reconsideration.
Instead, the true distinctiveness of insular powers may
come in their mode of expansion—cultivating spheres of
influence instead of conquest—rather than their proclivity
for it. If anything, our argument underscores that insular
powers may be especially capable of growing their relative
positions, rather than relying upon their inherent security
and foregoing further efforts to accumulate power. This, in
turn, directs attention to the importance of exploring
whether and to what extent insular powers’ capacity to
expand without conquest also influences their motivations
—a key arena for future theorizing on the broader effects
of insularity.
Equally important, that insular power expansion can
occur via spheres of influence raises the possibility of
bringing scholarship on insularity into fuller conversation
with research on hegemony, hierarchy, imperialism, and
order. As noted, much of the latter literature emphasizes
the economic, institutional, and normative underpinnings
of different kinds of superior-subordinate relationships in
international politics.20 Our work, in contrast, points to
the possibility that certain great powers are able to expand
without conquest largely because of where they are located
irrespective of what they look like at home or the policies
and values they embrace. It thus raises the question of
whether and how much of the expansion featured in the
hegemony and hierarchy scholarship can be accounted for
by geopolitical variables.
As such, this project as a whole highlights the potential
for linking an expanded appreciation for insularity (and
geography in general) with insights from the hegemony
and hierarchy literature in ways that may bolster both
research programs.21 For example, it may be the case that
each body of scholarship explains a portion of the expan-
sion puzzle, with geopolitical variables helping to explain
great powers’ opportunity to expand, and research on
hegemony and hierarchy capturing the content of the
resulting relationships. To put it another way, there may
be underexplored pathways by which great powers expand
9
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in manners similar to those discussed by hegemony and
hierarchy scholars but enabled by factors related to geo-
politics. In short, a renewed focus on insularity holds the
possibility of uncovering new sources of great power
influence in international politics in ways that can com-
plement other research programs.
Above all, our claims carry policy implications at a time
when American grand strategy is in flux (Lissner and
Rapp-Hooper 2018). On one level, critics of American
grand strategy contend that the United States is expan-
sionist in large part because of domestic and ideational
factors, with an entrenched foreign policy establishment
(Porter 2018;Walt 2018; Ashford 2020) wedded to liberal
ideology (Mearsheimer 2018) especially culpable. In con-
trast, our work implies that attributing U.S. expansion to
domestic and ideational factors may be incomplete:
because insularity can enable expansion, the sources of
the United States’ overseas presence may be broader than
critics of contemporary policy allow. By extension, even
the emergence of a new domestic consensus favoring a less-
engaged American role abroad might not temper
U.S. behavior—the freedom to roam and sterilizing effect
of insularity might still tempt expansion.
At the same time, this project underscores that the
United States is poised to retain significant flexibility in
its grand strategy. In doing so, it challenges claims
among proponents of prevailing policy that any
retrenchment is likely to foreclose American options in
the future by compromising alliance relationships and
allowing competitors to fill the void. Such claims are
widespread. Hal Brands, for example, claims that
retrenchment “might tempt [U.S. allies] to acquiesce
to, or bandwagon with, a rising China” and ease
“China’s ascent to regional hegemony” (Brands 2015,
21-22). Similarly, former National Security Advisor
H.R. McMaster argues that “a reduction in
U.S. support for allies and partners … could result in a
shift in the balance of power away from the United
States” (McMaster 2020: 185), while Tom Wright
alleges that retrenchment would “make it impossible
for the United States to maintain a political alliance
with the democratic world [as] countries would begin to
give China the benefit of the doubt” on key issues and so
leave the U.S. isolated (Wright 2020). Walk back
American expansion now—so this reasoning goes—
and the United States will not be able to act abroad in
the future.
Ultimately, our work challenges these concerns.
Because demand for the United States as a security pro-
vider is likely to increase the more geopolitics in other
regions are contested and divided, retrenchment may
generate more calls for the United States to move onshore
by increasing intra-regional tensions. Meanwhile, because
the United States’ freedom to roam will remain intact so
long as American insularity endures, the United States will
have the option of re-committing abroad as its interests
dictate. In short, insularity provides the United States with
structural advantages that afford it grand strategic latitude.
Far from requiring a sustained presence overseas, the
United States’ geographic position allows it to grow its
power and influence abroad at times and places of its
choosing. In this, it is like other insular powers past and
future.
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Notes
1 Our use of sphere of influence subtly breaks from the
use of the term in research on hegemony, hierarchy,
imperialism, and order. The latter literature usefully
suggests that expansion need not include conquest
while distinguishing among the different kinds of
arrangements—for example, spheres of influence,
protectorates, informal empires, etc.—that can emerge
as great powers gain influence over others’ foreign or
domestic affairs. In contrast, we focus on how insu-
larity enables great power expansion itself rather than
the specific features of the resulting relationships. For
the sake of theory development, we therefore simplify
the outcome of interest to distinguish between
expansion which occurs via “conquest,” and that
which occurs when great powers gain leverage over
others’ strategic affairs—what we generically term a
“sphere of influence.” Consistent with hegemony,
hierarchy, imperialism, and order scholarship, this
leaves open the possibility that other factors may
explain the specifics of any resulting arrangement.
2 Following Monteiro 2014, 42-47, we define a “great
power” as a state capable of defending itself against the
most powerful states in the system while projecting
sufficient power to threaten the interests of such states.
3 Extending this logic, a regional hegemon is an insular
power as long as it does not share a landmass with
another great power. The United States, for example, is
both a regional hegemon and an insular power because
it is the only great power in the Western Hemisphere.
4 We are not arguing that overseas expansion is solely an
insular power phenomenon. Indeed, continental
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powers such as Imperial Spain, the Dutch Republic,
France, and Germany have occasionally developed
large maritime forces for power projection. Rather, our
point is that expansion is especially puzzling for insular
powers which, given their significant latent security,
are thought to have fewer incentives for expansion
than continental powers.
5 An ongoing debate in IR theory concerns whether
conquest yields economic gains (Liberman 1996;
Brooks 2005). For our purposes, it suffices to note that
the economic utility of conquest is contestable: there is
some possibility conquest does not pay, such that
states seeking to expand face incentives to consider
alternate routes to increase their influence.
6 In an important amendment, Dan Altman (2020)
finds that the nature of territorial conquest has evolved
over time, with fewer wars initiated to conquer whole
states but regular use of faits accomplis to seize pieces of
territory.
7 Of course, insular powers may also opt not to expand.
8 Hence, insular powers should stop short of expanding
into the homelands of other great powers.
9 Research on unipolarity suggests a similar trend:
because unipoles are, by definition, unconstrained by
other great powers, they are able towidely project power
and influence (Waltz 2000, 13; Jervis 2009, 197;
Crawford 2003, Conclusion). Rather than claiming
that only unipoles can so act, our argument extends the
insight to highlight that insular powers can more
generally act abroad with reduced external pressures:
free from attack at home unless other great powers
develop the capacity to project power over water, they
can more readily focus on expansion. Note, too, that
these issues may interact, with insularity abetting a
state’s rise to unipolarity in part by enabling expansion.
10 Relatedly, see Elman (2004) and Ross (2009). This is
also why—contrary to earlier geopolitical thinkers’
expectations (MacKinder 1904)—location within
territorial Eurasia has not become a springboard for
global hegemony.
11 See also Williamson 1969, Howard 1972, Friedberg
1988. This is consistent with Julian Corbett’s 1918,
48, argument that island powers enjoying control of
the sea can choose to limit their involvement in any
war they enter.
12 It did not help that Wilhelmine Germany was polit-
ically constrained from raising tax revenues to fund its
naval buildup; D’Lugo and Rogowski 1993.
13 Similarly, Jack Levy and William Thompson 2010
argue that sea powers—many of which are insular
states—elicit less counterbalancing than land powers
because they are less territorially threatening and can
provide public goods.
14 Walt 1987, 277, makes a version of this point in the
U.S. context: “For the middle-level powers ofWestern
Europe and Asia, the United Sates is the perfect ally.
Its aggregate power ensures that its voice will be heard
and its actions will be felt … . At the same time, the
United States is far enough away so as not to pose a
significant threat.”
15 Relatedly, see Elman 2004, 566.
16 In fact, the prospect of other great powers moving in
helped trigger Japanese conquest to prevent other
actors from hindering Japan’s expansion; (Greve and
Levy 2018; Streich and Levy 2016.
17 Again, we contend that insularity affects the oppor-
tunities states have to expand without necessarily
causing them to exploit the opportunity. This dis-
tinction may help explain instances where, in contrast
to the U.S. experience discussed later, insular powers
opted not to craft spheres of influence. Indeed, such
seeming discrepancies may be the exceptions that
prove the general argument. Illustrative is Britain’s
reluctance to craft a European sphere of influence in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: consist-
ent with our argument, several of Europe’s continental
powers sought to entice Britain into a more active role
in continental security throughout the late 1800s and
early 1900s, just as a subset of British strategists
expressed interest in developing the military forces to
play a more assertive continental role (Millman 1965;
Williamson 1969; Steiner 1977). In short, although
no British sphere of influence formed, there are hints
that insularity nevertheless afforded Britain the
opportunity to expand had it wanted.
18 There is a downside to insularity in the context of
U.S. overseas expansion: it has made reassurance more
difficult (Blankenship 2020), leading at times to a
strong focus on bolstering U.S. credibility in
U.S. foreign policy.
19 As Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev told Secretary
of State James Baker in May 1990 when discussing
post-Cold War European security, “I think that both
in Europe and here in the Soviet Union we recognize
the need for US presence;” Memorandum of Con-
versation, May 1, 1990, Mikhail Gorbachev, Eduard
Shevardnadze, and James Baker, folder “Gorbachev
(Dobrynin) Sensitive 1989—June 1990 [Copy Set]
[2],” box 91127, Scowcroft Files, George Bush Presi-
dential Library, College Station, Texas.
20 For a recent take on order that draws more heavily
from material and power variables, however, see Las-
curettes 2020.
21 Similarly, our findings on the advantages of insularity
may carry implications for other research including that
on international political economy. For example, insu-
larity may inform why the United States, like Britain
before it, is able to leverage its place in the global




Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 92.236.48.118, on 15 Nov 2021 at 12:28:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
References
Adams, Karen Ruth. 2003/04. “Attack and Conquer?
International Anarchy and the Offense-Defense-
Deterrence Balance.” International Security 28(3):
45–83.
Altman, Dan. 2020. “The Evolution of Territorial
Conquest After 1945 and the Limits of the Territorial
Integrity Norm.” International Organization 74(3):
490–522.
Ashford, Emma. 2020. “Build a Better Blob.” Foreign
Affairs, May 29. (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/2020-05-28/build-better-blob).
Bar-Siman-Tov, Y., P.L. Hahn, and D. Schoenbaum.
1998. “The United States and Israel since 1948: A
‘Special Relationship’?” Diplomatic History 22(2):
231–62.
Baylis, John. 1984. “Britain, the Brussels Pact, and the
Continental Commitment.” International Affairs 60(4):
615–29.
Blagden, David W., Jack S. Levy, and William R.
Thompson. 2011. “Sea Powers, Continental Powers,
and Balancing Theory.” International Security 36, no. 2:
190–202.
Blankenship, Brian. 2020. “Promises under Pressure:
Statements of Reassurance in US Alliances.”
International Studies Quarterly 64(4): 1017–30.
Boulding, Kenneth E. 1962. Conflict and Defense: A
General Theory. New York: Harper.
Brands, Hal. 2015. “Fools RushOut? The Flawed Logic of
Offshore Balancing.” Washington Quarterly 38(2):
7–28.
Brooks, Stephen G. 2005. Producing Security:
Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the
Changing Calculus of Conflict. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Brooks, Stephen G., and William C. Wohlforth. 2016.
America Abroad: The United States’ Global Role in the
21st Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Campbell, Kurt M., and Jake Sullivan. 2019.
“Competition without Catastrophe: How America Can
Both Challenge and Coexist with China.” Foreign
Affairs 5:96–111.
Christensen, Thomas J. 1999. “China, the U.S.–Japan
Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia.”
International Security 23(4): 49–80.
Clark, Ian. 2009a. “Towards an English School Theory of
Hegemony.” European Journal of International Relations
15(2): 203–28.
——. 2009b. “Bringing Hegemony Back In: The United
States and International Order.” International Affairs
85(1): 23–36.
Cooley, Alexander, and Daniel Nexon. 2020. Exit from
Hegemony: The Unraveling of the American Global
Order. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Corbett, Julian S. 1918. Some Principles of Maritime
Strategy. 2nd ed. London: Longman.
Crawford, Timothy W. 2003. Pivotal Deterrence: Third-
Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press.
Cull, Nicholas J. 1995. Selling War: The British
Propaganda Campaign against American “Neutrality” in
World War II. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
D’Lugo, David, and Ronald Rogowski. 1993. “The
Anglo-German Naval Race and Comparative
Constitutional ‘Fitness.’” In The Domestic Bases of
Grand Strategy, ed. Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A.
Stein, 65–95. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Dockrill, Saki R. 2002. Britain’s Retreat from East of Suez:
The Choice Between Europe and the World? London:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Elman, Colin. 2004. “Extending Offensive Realism: The
Louisiana Purchase and America's Rise to Regional
Hegemony.” American Political Science Review 98(4):
563–76.
Fang, Songying, Jesse C. Johnson, and Brett Ashley Leeds.
2014. “ToConcede or to Resist? The Restraining Effect
ofMilitary Alliances.” International Organization 68(4):
775–809.
Farrell, Henry, and Abraham L. Newman. 2019.
“Weaponized Interdependence: How Global
Economic Networks Shape State Coercion.”
International Security 44(1): 42–79.
Fazal, Tanisha M. 2007. State Death: The Politics and
Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Fravel, M. Taylor. 2019. Active Defense: China’s Military
Strategy since 1949. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Friedberg, Aaron. 1988. The Weary Titan: Britain and the
Experience of Relative Decline, 1895–1905. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Gaddis, John L. 1982. Strategies of Containment: A Critical
Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Gavin, Francis J. 2015. “Strategies of Inhibition:
U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution,
and Nonproliferation.” International Security 40(1):
9–46.
Gerzhoy, Gene. 2015. “Alliance Coercion and Nuclear
Restraint: How the United States Thwarted West
Germany’s Nuclear Ambitions.” International Security
39(4): 91–129.
Gilpin, Robert. 1981. War and Change in World Politics.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Glaser, Charles L. 2010. Rational Theory of International
Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Glaser, Charles L., and Chaim Kaufmann. 1998. “What Is
the Offense-Defense Balance and CanWeMeasure It?”
International Security 22(4): 44–82.
12 Perspectives on Politics
Article | Revisiting Insularity and Expansion
https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759272100222X
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 92.236.48.118, on 15 Nov 2021 at 12:28:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
Go, Julian. 2011. Patterns of Empire: The British and
American Empires, 1688 to the Present. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Goh, Evelyn. 2007. “Great Powers and Hierarchical
Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security
Strategies.” International Security 32(3): 113–57.
Goldgeier, James M. 1999. Not Whether but When: The
U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO. Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution Press.
Gompert, David C. 2013. Sea Power and American
Interests in the Western Pacific. Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation.
Greve, Andrew Q., and Jack S. Levy. 2018. “Power
Transitions, Status Dissatisfaction, andWar: The Sino-
Japanese War of 1894–1895.” Security Studies 27(1):
148–78.
Grynaviski, Eric. 2018. America’s Middlemen: Power at the
Edge of Empire. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hicks, Kathleen, and Michael J. Green. 2016. “Revving
Up the Rebalance to Asia.” Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 26 January. (http://
www.cogitasia.com/revving-up-the-rebalance-to-asia/).
Hoffman, Elizabeth Cobbs. 2013. American Umpire.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Howard, Michael. 1972. The Continental Commitment:
The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of the
Two World Wars. London: Maurice Temple Smith.
Ikenberry, G. John. 2001. After Victory: Institutions,
Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after
Major Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
——. 2011. Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and
Transformation of the AmericanWorld Order. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Ikenberry, G. John, and Daniel H. Nexon. 2019.
“Hegemony Studies 3.0: The Dynamics of Hegemonic
Orders.” Security Studies 28(3): 395–421.
Ireland, Timothy. 1981. Creating the Entangling Alliance.
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Jackson, Van. 2020. “Understanding Spheres of Influence
in International Politics.” European Journal of
International Security 5(3): 255–73.
Jaffe, Lorna S. 1993. The Development of the Base Force,
1989-1992. Washington, DC: Joint History Office,
Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Jervis, Robert. 1978. “Cooperation Under the Security
Dilemma.” World Politics 30(2): 167–214.
——. 2009. “Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective.”
World Politics 61(1): 188–213.
Joffe, Josef. 1995. “‘Bismarck’ or ‘Britain’? Toward an
American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity.”
International Security 19(4): 94–117.
——. 1997. “How America Does It.” Foreign Affairs 76
(5): 16–18
Kingseed, Cole Christian. 1995. Eisenhower and the Suez
Crisis of 1956. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State
University Press.
Kohli, Atul. 2020. Imperialism and the Developing World:
How Britain and the United States Shaped the Global
Periphery (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press,
2020).
Kupchan, Charles A. 2014. “The Normative Foundations
of Hegemony and the Coming Challenge to Pax
Americana.” Security Studies 23(2): 219–57.
Labs, Eric J. 1992. “Do Weak States Bandwagon?”
Security Studies 1(3) 383–416.
Lake, David A. 1993. “Leadership, Hegemony, and the
International Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered
Monarch with Potential?” International Studies
Quarterly 37(4): 459–89.
——. 1999. Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy
in Its Century. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
——. 2008. “The New American Empire?” International
Studies Perspectives 9(3): 281–89.
——. 2009. Hierarchy in International Relations. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press.
Lascurettes, Kyle M. 2020. Orders of Exclusion: Great
Powers and the Strategic Sources of Foundational Rules in
International Relations. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Layne, Christopher. 2002. “The ‘Poster Child for
Offensive Realism’: America as a Global Hegemon.”
Security Studies 12(2): 120–64.
——. 2006. The Peace of Illusions: American Grand
Strategy from 1940 to the Present. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.
Leffler, Melvyn. 1992. A Preponderance of Power: National
Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Levy, Jack S., and William R. Thompson. 2010.
“Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally against
the Leading Global Power?” International Security
35(1): 7–43.
Liberman, Peter. 1996. Does Conquest Pay? The
Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Lind, Jennifer M. 2004. “Pacifism or Passing the Buck?
Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy.”
International Security 29(1): 92–121.
——. 2014. “Pivot Problems.” Foreign Affairs, 25 June.
(https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2014-
06-25/pivot-problems).
Lissner, Rebecca Friedman, and Mira Rapp-Hooper.
2018. “The Day After Trump: American Strategy for a




Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 92.236.48.118, on 15 Nov 2021 at 12:28:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
Litwak, Robert. 1984. Détente and the Nixon Doctrine:
American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability,
1969–1976. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Long, David E. 1985. The United States and Saudi Arabia:
Ambivalent Allies. Abingdon: Routledge.
Lundestad, Geir. 1999. “‘Empire by Invitation’ in the
American Century.” Diplomatic History 23(2):
189–217.
MacDonald, Paul. 2014. Networks of Domination: The
Social Foundations of Peripheral Conquest in
International Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
MacDonald, Paul K., and Joseph M. Parent. 2011.
“Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great
Power Retrenchment.” International Security 35(4):
7–44.
MacKinder, Halford J. 1904. “The Geographical Pivot of
History.” Geographical Journal 23(4): 421–37.
McMaster, H.R. 2020. “The Retrenchment Syndrome.”
Foreign Affairs 99(4): 183–86.
Mearsheimer, John J. 2014. The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.
——. 2018. The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and
International Realities. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
Middleton, Karen. 2011. An Unwinnable War: Australia
in Afghanistan. Carlton Victoria: Melbourne University
Publishing.
Millman, Richard. 1965. British Foreign Policy and the
Coming of the Franco-Prussian War. New York:
Clarendon.
Mitre, Jim. 2018. “A Eulogy for the Two-War
Construct.” Washington Quarterly 41(4): 7–30.
Moller, Sarah Bjerg. 2020. “Twenty Years After: Assessing
the Consequences of Enlargement for the NATO
Military Alliance.” International Politics 57(3): 509–29.
Monteiro, Nuno P. 2014. Theory of Unipolar Politics.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Montgomery, Evan Braden. 2006. “Breaking Out of the
Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and the
Problem of Uncertainty.” International Security 31(1):
151–85.
——. 2014. “Contested Primacy in the Western Pacific:
China’s Rise and the Future of U.S. Power Projection.”
International Security 38(4): 115–49.
Morgenthau, Hans. 1963. Politics among Nations. 3rd ed.
New York: Knopf.
Mueller, John E. 1989. Retreat from Doomsday: The
Obsolescence of Major War. New York: Basic Books.
Murray, Michelle. 2010. “Identity, Insecurity, and Great
Power Politics: The Tragedy of German Naval
Ambition before the First World War.” Security Studies
19(4): 656–88.
Nexon, Daniel H., and Iver B. Neumann. 2018.
“Hegemonic-Order Theory: A Field-Theoretic
Account.” European Journal of International Relations
24(3): 662–86.
Nexon, Daniel H., and ThomasWright. 2007. “What’s at
Stake in the American Empire Debate?” American
Political Science Review 101, no. 2: 253–271.
Norrlof, Carla. 2010. America’s Global Advantage: US
Hegemony and International Cooperation. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Nye, Joseph S. 1995. “The Case for Deep Engagement.”
Foreign Affairs 74(4): 90–102.
Packham, Colin. 2020. “With Eyes on Indo-Pacific,
Australia to Rapidly Increase Defence Spending.”




Porter, Andrew, and Alaine Low (eds.). 1999. The Oxford
History of the British Empire, Volume III: The Nineteenth
Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Porter, Patrick. 2018. “Why America’s Grand Strategy
Has Not Changed: Power, Habit, and the U.S. Foreign
Policy Establishment.” International Security 42(4):
9–46.
Posen, Barry R. 1984. The Sources of Military Doctrine:
France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
——. 2002. “The Best Defense.” National Interest 67:
119–26.
——. 2003. “Command of the Commons: The Military
Foundation of U.S. Hegemony.” International Security
28(1): 5–46.
——. 2014. Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand
Strategy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Pressman, Jeremy. 2008. Warring Friends: Alliance
Restraint in International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.
Rapp-Hooper, Mira. 2020. Shields of the Republic: The
Triumph and Peril of America’s Alliances. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Ripsman, Norrin M., Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E.
Lobell. 2016.Neoclassical Realist Theory of International
Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rodger, N.A.M. 2006. The Command of the Ocean: A
Naval History of Britain, 1649–1815. London:
Penguin.
Roshwald, Ariel. 2000. Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of
Empires: Central Europe, the Middle East and Russia,
1914–23. New York: Routledge.
Ross, Robert S. 2009. “China’s Naval Nationalism:
Sources, Prospects, and the U.S. Response.”
International Security 34(2): 46–81.
Samuels, Richard J. 2007. Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand
Strategy and the Future of East Asia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.
14 Perspectives on Politics
Article | Revisiting Insularity and Expansion
https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759272100222X
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 92.236.48.118, on 15 Nov 2021 at 12:28:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
Sarotte, Mary Elise. 2009. 1989: The Struggle to Create
Post-Cold War Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
——. 2019a. “The Convincing Call fromCentral Europe:
Let Us IntoNATO.” Foreign Affairs,March 12 (https://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-03-12/
convincing-call-central-europe-let-us-nato).
——. 2019b. “How to Enlarge NATO: The Debate
inside the Clinton Administration, 1993–95.”
International Security 44(1): 7–41.
Sayle, Timothy. 2019. Enduring Alliance: A History of
NATO and the Postwar Global Order. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press.
Schuessler, John M., and Joshua R. Shifrinson. 2019.
“The Shadow of Exit from NATO.” Strategic Studies
Quarterly 13(3): 38–51.
Schweller, Randall. 1994. “Bandwagoning for Profit:
Bringing the Revisionist State Back In.” International
Security 19(1): 72–107.
——. 2011. “Rational Theory for a Bygone Era.” Security
Studies 20(3): 460–68.
Shifrinson, Joshua R. Itzkowitz. 2018. Rising Titans,
Falling Giants: How Great Powers Exploit Power Shifts.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
——. 2020a. “The Rise of China, Balance of Power
Theory and US National Security: Reasons for
Optimism?” Journal of Strategic Studies 43(2):
175–216.
——. 2020b. “Eastbound and Down: The United States,
NATO Enlargement, and Suppressing the Soviet and
Western European Alternatives, 1990–1992.” Journal
of Strategic Studies 43(6-7): 816–46.
Silove, Nina. 2016. “The Pivot before the Pivot:
U.S. Strategy to Preserve the Power Balance in Asia.”
International Security 40(4): 45–88.
Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. 1973.
"Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major
Power War, 1820–1965." In Peace, War, and Numbers,
ed. Bruce Russett, 19–48. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Stein, Janice Gross. 1991. “Reassurance in International
Conflict Management.” Political Science Quarterly
106(3): 431–51.
Steiner, Zara S. 1969. The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy,
1898–1914. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
——. Britain and the Origins of the First World War.
New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Streich, Philip, and Jack S. Levy. 2016. “Information,
Commitment, and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–
1905.” Foreign Policy Analysis 12(4): 489–511.
Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. 2000. “Security Seeking under
Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited.” International
Security 25(3): 128–61.
Trachtenberg, Marc. 1999. A Constructed Peace: The
Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Tucker, Robert W. 2007. Woodrow Wilson and the Great
War: Reconsidering America’s Neutrality, 1914–1917.
Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.
Van Evera, Stephen. 1998. “Offense, Defense, and the
Causes of War.” International Security 22(4): 5–43.
——. 1999.Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Van Hooft, Paul. 2020. “All-In or All-Out: Why
Insularity Pushes and Pulls American Grand Strategy to
Extremes.” Security Studies 29(4): 701–29.
Walt, Stephen M. 1987. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press.
——. 2018. The Hell of Good Intentions: America’s Foreign
Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy. New York:
Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Waltz, Kenneth N. 2000. “Structural Realism after the
Cold War.” International Security 25(1): 5–41.
Weiss, Jessica Chen. 2019. “HowHawkish Is the Chinese
Public? Another Look at ‘Rising Nationalism’ and
Chinese Foreign Policy.” Journal of Contemporary
China 28(119): 679–95.
Williamson, Samuel R. 1969.The Politics of Grand Strategy:
Britain and France Prepare for War,
1904–1914. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Wohlforth, William C. 1999. “The Stability of a Unipolar
World.” International Security 24(1): 5–41.
Woods, Randall. 1990. A Changing of the Guard: Anglo-
American Relations, 1941–1946. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press.
Wright, Thomas. 2020. “The Folly of Retrenchment.”
Foreign Affairs 99(2): 10–18.
Wuthnow, Joel. 2018. “Asian Security without the United
States? Examining China’s Security Strategy in
Maritime and Continental Asia.” Asian Security 14(3):
233–45.
Zacher, Mark W. 2001. “The Territorial Integrity Norm:
International Boundaries and the Use of Force.”
International Organization 55(2): 215–50.
Zoellick, Robert B. 2011. “An Architecture of
U.S. Strategy after the Cold War.” In In Uncertain
Times: American Foreign Policy After the Berlin Wall and
9/11, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey Legro, 26–43.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
15
https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759272100222X
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 92.236.48.118, on 15 Nov 2021 at 12:28:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
